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Religiously affiliated law schools have, for the most part, given little
thought to the integration of faculty members who are from faith
communities other than their own. This article will consider the question
of how religiously affiliated law schools cannot simply be tolerant, but
truly include faculty members of all religious faiths in the development of
mission and community in such law schools, using the lens of the religious
metaphors of pilgrimage and Exodus. At one level, perhaps trivial, one
might challenge such law schools by playing on the modem linguistic use
of the terms of my title, "Pilgrimage or Exodus?" That is, we might ask,
are our law schools going to be places of pilgrimage, places that academics
of varying religious persuasions flock to because they are devoted not only
to the reality but the ideal of welcoming all, in a way that shines light and
hope to a pluralistic world? Or are they going to be institutions so hostile
to some journeys toward the truth that religious minority faculty members
beat a hasty exodus as soon as they can find another place that will grant
them tenure?
It is difficult to find helpful evidence for reflection on the role of
religious minorities in religiously affiliated institutions. My own
experience, while not uniform, was not a great deal of help. After
observing as a student at a law school affiliated with my own Lutheran
denomination and then at a once intensely religious but now proudly
secular university,' I have taught for 20 years at a Methodist university
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law and Editor, Journal of Law
and Religion. Portions of this paper were delivered as part of a panel entitled "Integrating
Faculty Who Do Not Share the Institution's Religious Tradition Into Advancing the
Tradition," at the Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, University of Notre
Dame Law School, March 27, 2004. My thanks to Walter Pratt and members of the
Conference for inviting me.
1. Valparaiso University School of Law, and Yale Law School, respectively. Cf
SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS I-STORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 162-63, 288, 295-
98, 415-16 (1973) (describing the "strictly ecclesiastical" fruits coming from the formation
of Yale University by New England Puritans affiliated with the Mather family, and
subsequent impact on American religious life because of the Yale experience of such
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where there are no vocally Methodist law faculty members; and those who
have most visibly and consistently participated in the school's Law,
Religion, and Ethics projects have been Jewish, Quaker and Lutheran.
Though these traditions, and others, influence religious mission discussions
at my current law school more than Methodism, it was difficult to identify
any "best practices" in the sense of distinctive or consciously chosen paths
that created an environment where religious persons who do not hail from
the institution's religious tradition in effect have the most profound
religious influence on that mission.
Thus, to seek some evidence about whether there was a pattern to the
response of religiously affiliated law schools to other religious faculty at
their institutions, I did a small and informal survey of several people who
have taught at religious law schools not of their own religious persuasion,
to see whether I could uncover some best practices of inclusivity.2
My little informal survey has confirmed again what many other
scholars have argued in many other venues. First, a fair number of law
schools affiliated with religious universities claim and display little or no
religious identity whatsoever.3 Second, those law schools that do claim
some religious identity vary widely in the intensity and type of expression
of that identity. Some have community prayer and require classes that treat
religious issues, while for other schools, the only visible nod to religious
identity consists of some physical religious symbols around the building
and perhaps a related religious event once a year, such as a Red Mass or an
opening or closing religious convocation.4
significant religious thinkers as Samuel Johnson, Jonathan Edwards, and Timothy Dwight),
and Dean James P. White, Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: Their Role in American
Legal Education, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 371 (1995) (noting Yale's original religious affiliation)
with YALE LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN, (describing without reference to religion the outgrowth
of Yale law school from law office practice and subsequent merger with Yale University),
available at http://www.yale.edu/bulletin/html/law/study.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
For a comparison, see Valparaiso University Graduate Schools' catalogue (describing
Valparaiso's "Lutheran heritage of scholarship, freedom, and faith . . ."), available at
http://www.valpo.edu/registrar/catalog/02gintro.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
2. I thank those who responded - and to whom I offered anonymity - for their very
gracious and thoughtful help in my struggle to gain clarity.
3. Among others who have made variations on this argument, see, e.g., Thomas L.
Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in Religiously Affiliated American Law Schools,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1859, 1864 n.18 (1993) (positing that thirty-seven of the forty-eight law
schools affiliated with Christian or Jewish traditions are "functionally secular," seven are
Erastian, and four are sectarian); Robert John Aranjo, "The Harvest is Plentiful, but the
Laborers are Few": Hiring Practices and Religiously Affiliated Universities, 30 U. RICH. L.
REv. 713, 718 (1996) (noting, inter alia, Professor Mark Tushnet's observation that a
university 'will find it extremely difficulty' to maintain [a religious] affiliation if it also
seeks to attain or preserve a national reputation.").
4. For written descriptions about how some law schools negotiate their religious
identities, see, e.g., Nicholas P. Cafardi, Catholic Law Schools and Ex Corde Ecclesiae, or
What Makes a Law School Catholic?, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 7, 14 (2001); John J. Fitzgerald,
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Third, it appears that even those law schools with a more pervasive
religious identity have, by and large, not thought in any extended conscious
way about how religious minorities might be part of the process of creating
a mission tied to religious identity, no matter how much or little attention
these schools have lavished on the question of their own (majority)
religious identity.5
Fourth, religious minority faculty are not of one mind about whether
the presence or absence of religious identity is a good thing or bad thing,
either for the institution or for their integration into the life of the school.
Indeed, religious minorities on law faculties even differ significantly on the
question of whether clearly sectarian "practices" exclude them as part of
the community - even, for example, about whether having Christian
prayer before classes or faculty meetings is a barrier or aid to integration.
Like all legal questions - perhaps like all human questions - the answer
seems to be "it depends on the context and the people involved."
Into this unclear picture leaps the theorist! As my descriptive foray, I
want to argue that law schools display certain sorts of "character" or that
they display distinctive models of the role of religion in their common life.
I borrow by analogy from scholars like H. Richard Niebuhr
6 and Carl
Esbeck 7 who have suggested that religious traditions have distinct
characters. Niebuhr, for example, wants to claim that denominations
exhibit a Christ Against Culture character, or a Christ and Culture
character.8 I want to quickly sketch just one typology, and then suggest
what is probably salutary and what is potentially problematical about each
type, in terms of the integration of religious minority faculty. The usual
caveat about typologies needs to be given, however: the main purpose of
this one is to highlight problems rather than to accurately represent any one
or any collective group of faculty members' actual experience, which is
necessarily richer and more complex than I will be describing.
After presenting this typology for critiquing law school practices, I
want to turn my presentation upon itself, deconstructing the very premises
of the question through the metaphors of pilgrimage and exodus. I will
argue that a proper understanding of the "integration" question requires
Today's Catholic Law Schools in Theory and Practice: Are We Preserving Our Identity?, 15
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS& PUB. POL'Y 245, 251-60 (2001).
5. Some consideration to these issues with respect to students or faculty appears in
the literature on religiously affiliated law schools. See, e.g., Howard B. Eisenberg, Mission,
Marketing, and Academic Freedom in Today's Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: An
Essay, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
6. See H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951). For an example of the
Niebuhr typology applied in a jurisprudential framework, see Michael W. McConnell,
Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of First Amendment Jurisprudence,
42 DEPAULL. REV. 191 (1992).
7. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Typology of Church-State Relations in Current American
Thought, in RELIGION, PUBLIC LIFE, AND THE AMERICAN POLrrY 3 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 1994).
8. See NIEBUHR, supra note 6, at 83.
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religiously affiliated schools to acknowledge the true host for their work,
which is not - as is commonly assumed - those faculty and staff
members whose faith tradition is the same as the law school's.
I. ONCE MORE ON ENLIGHTENMENT APPROACHES TO LAW SCHOOLS
A first type of response, what might be termed the Enlightenment
response to religion in law schools, has been endlessly debated and often
excoriated at law and religion conferences and in the literature.9 The model
proposes that religion is a private, irrational matter that should be relegated
to the family home and religious community, serving as a valuable
motivator for ethical professional behavior but not otherwise significantly
influencing law or legal institutions, including law schools.' 0 However,
any candid discussion of this model must acknowledge its apparent
attraction for many religious minorities, even those with the professional
status and independence of law professors." Some religious minority law
faculty continue to believe - and understandably so, based on the
reception of their own religious tradition in American public life - that if
religion becomes a prominent and visible part of their law school's mission
and ethos, it will be used in harmful ways against minority faculty and
students. Or, at the very least, they are concerned that religious identity
will be used to symbolically segregate minority faculty and students,
marking them off as "odd" and "outside" the law school mainstream, thus
potentially excluding them from influence on the mission and direction of
the school, much less the status and rewards that accompany our
profession.
If the law school atmosphere can be completely secularized, minority
as well as majority faculty who believe in the Enlightenment model would
say, minorities have the opportunity to be treated equally on the basis of
9. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., A Catholic Law School, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1037, 1044 (1992) (criticizing nominally Catholic law schools "whose faculty were hostile
or contemptuous of Catholic values, schools whose whole tone was less open to religion
than avowedly secular institutions"); Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto
Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 203, 211-16 (1998) (describing absence of religion as a
resource in law school classrooms); see also Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in
the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80
MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1078 (1996) (noting colleagues' remarks that "religious claims are
absurd, ridiculous, irrational, or unworthy of respect" but that he had never heard a
colleague "make a religious claim in an academic context"); Shaffer, supra note 3, at 1860-
64 (criticizing the ABA's "theological preference for secularism" over other theological
missions).
10. For a description of the assumptions of the public-private split, see, e.g., SuzannaSherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. L. J. 453, 476-77 (1996) (arguing for a separation of
public reason and private emotion); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to
Religion, 78 VA. L. REv. 671, 674-77 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy
Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 502-09 (1998) (arguing that allowing
religion into the public square endangers Jewish participation).
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their objective merit as law teachers and scholars. To the extent politics
raises its head, the Enlightenment law teacher hopes, it will be in debates
over what sort of secularized activity is meritorious - e.g., whether
scholarly merit should be judged by how prestigious one's law review
article placement is and whether teaching should be judged by bar passage
rates or by student satisfaction evaluations.
In a sense, the decision to adopt an Enlightenment model can be a
form of integrative strategy (if everyone is equally disadvantaged, there are
no minorities). However, it is also essentially a question to all religiously
affiliated law schools about whether they delude themselves into thinking
that any such school can also be hospitable to diversity. That is, it is
essentially a challenge to whether religiously affiliated law schools should
have ANY religiously related mission, in light of the potential effects both
on the ideal of equality and the real persons law school communities have
power to harm.
Of course, though most who attend conferences of religiously
affiliated schools may well have concluded differently, in the spirit of
keeping everyone humble, we need to remember that those who continue to
hold to the Enlightenment model have some history on their side. The
folklore, at least, is that Jews and Catholics were excluded from the faculty
of prominent law schools for a very long time - and some think that
serious Catholics still are excluded in some of 
the elite institutions.'
2
Moreover, at present, I see no reason to try to convince Muslim lawyers,
for example, that their faith tradition will never be used against them in law
faculty hiring decisions. Based on my conversations, I am confident that at
least in some law schools, a Muslim candidate would be quizzed on his
position on Jews and Israel, and the answer would be decisive in the hiring
decision. Then there are subtler and unconscious questions, such as how
successful a Muslim woman who was wearing a full hijab might be in
securing a position after she interviewed at the AALS hiring conference. I
would venture to guess that a Rastafarian and a vocally pro-life anti-gay
conservative Christian, to just name two religious minorities, might have
some of the same problems. And that is not even counting perhaps a
handful of law schools that admit to raising explicit questions in the
interview process on candidates' faith traditions or religious or ethical
commitments.
12. See, e.g., David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Proposals to Counter Continuing
Resistance to the Implementation of Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 74 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 629, 637
(2000) (arguing that "[a]nti-Catholicism within the elite law school faculties is the open and
notorious 'secret' of the legal academy. There are virtually no Catholics on the elite private
and public secular law school faculties; there are only a few actively committed non-
Catholic Christians."); see also John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy
Preferences at Harvard and Yale, 26 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 491, 494-97 (1993)
(describing ways in which Yale and Harvard limited the numbers of incoming Jewish and
Catholic students until the 1960s).
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As many before me have suggested, some nominally religious law
schools that have consciously or unconsciously agreed to the
Enlightenment model can, without any overt practices, still signal to
members of the community in subtle ways that it is distasteful to speak of
religion, minority or majority, when one is discussing law. While a student
or faculty member who "wears his religion on his sleeve" in the law school
may not be directly punished for his behavior, law school communities
often react much the same as wealthy people at a cocktail party react if one
introduces the subject of starving and homeless children."
Law students can be the worst offenders, imposing their own social
code of classroom etiquette, shifting uneasily or in horror in their seats if a
classmate makes a religious argument on any matter ranging from the death
penalty or abortion to the right view about property. However, this
uneasiness about explicit references to religion is not limited to students:
faculty too can signal to religious faculty that they risk being shamed if
they make such arguments. As my colleague Howard Vogel pointed out, if
law students and faculty have a strong need to be well-liked and well-
thought-of, such practices can be just as successful as any explicit
punishing behavior in narrowing the parameters of what is considered
"seemly" conversation.' 4
While for some Enlightenment law schools, this implicit agreement
that such religious talk is out of bounds might indeed be integrative - i.e.,
a good faith attempt to include religious minorities in their midst, I suspect
that other concerns are more directly at play. One is almost aesthetic: the
language of faith is too personal, too "emotional." It makes its speaker
seem too vulnerable in a convention of objectivity and impersonality that
characterizes most law school debate; she may be thought to lack the
conventional skills that some law schools believe themselves to be teaching
their students.' 5 Ann Douglas' argument that religion was relegated to the
"sentimental" women's sphere in mid-19th century American life' 6 might
be validated today, I would suggest, by studying similarities in law
13. See e.g., Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation: What's "Religious
Diversity" Got to Do with It? 78 MARQ. L. REv. 427, 467-68 (1995) (suggesting that religion
is "often viewed as the uninvited, embarrassing guest at academe's celebration of 'cultural
diversity.' It alone is viewed as a conversation stopper.").
14. Conversation with Howard J. Vogel, around Mar. 30, 2004.
15. For the classic description of this phenomenon, see Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the
Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509, (1987) (discussing the problems with
objectivism and relativism, and reviewing his earlier argument that law schools promote risk
promoting 'moral relativism tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an
amoral instrumentalism, a realism tending toward cynicism, an individualism tending
toward atomism, and a faith in reason and democratic processes tending toward mere
credulity and idolatry."').
16. See ANN C. DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTuRE 8-13, 41-43
(1977).
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classroom body-language responses to religious arguments and to other
arguments from emotion often ascribed to women 
students.' 7
A second Enlightenment-style objection to religion or religious
argument in law schools is based on disciplinary pigeonholing biases that
law schools also share: faculty might argue that the language, categories
and intellectual "moves" of religious thought are foreign to those of the
law, and the effort required to perceive analogies or translate definitions
seems too difficult. Historians and others whose primary disciplinary focus
is not law have had some of the same problems in the legal academy,
though perhaps not as pronounced. But, this is another example of how a
seemingly inclusive strategy might in fact exclude.
A third dynamic at work, of course, is the incorrect but still strong
sense that there is a "constitutional" problem with law schools displaying
any religious affiliation, as any number of academics have illustrated. As
the most apocryphal example, we might remember Tom Shaffer's
experience with a student who wondered whether the crosses in Notre
Dame's law school classrooms didn't represent 
a church-state violation.'
8
Clearly, the ethos of separation is so strong in the American imagination
that it governs the subconscious of those who inhabit even private
institutions that undertake public roles, including lawmaking and
interpretation.
When religious minority law teachers either subscribe to, or at least
accede to, the Enlightenment position, things might indeed appear to be
calm and egalitarian around the law school. However, like any agreement
in any family or community not to talk about certain important and hotly
contested matters, what passes for peaceful coexistence is often a cover for
other less desirable states of affairs, -including a cauldron of conflict that is
being covered up.
Many scholars have fully rehearsed the problematical effects the
Enlightenment "agreement" can have on civil culture.'
9 However, the
Enlightenment "agreement" can also have a pernicious effect not only
individually, on those who believe that they must speak in faith terms in
17. And here, I am taking issue with Professor Suzanna Sherry's taking issue with 
both
feminist and religious legal academics for their insistence on making the feminine 
and the
religious a welcome part of the public discussion in legal education and public 
culture.
Sherry argues "for a scheme analogous to what one scholar has characterized 
as the
eighteenth-century 'schizophrenic conception of God': the rational 'Divine Engineer' 
in
public, and the warmer, more mystical 'Heavenly Father' for 'personal religious experience."'
Sherry, supra note 10, at 476-77 (quoting JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT 
CREED:
THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA 59 (1985)).
18. This story (because it has been repeated in this type of literature) was, I believe,
first printed in Shaffer, supra note 3, at 1863-64.
19. Again, the probably most-cited, but not only argument on this point, is STEPHEN 
L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 217-18 (1993); for a contrary view, see Sherry, supra note 10, at 476-
77.
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their daily lives, but more significantly, on the law school community as a
whole. Intellectually speaking, the "Enlightenment agreement" can both
desiccate the intellectual conversation at a law school, and hide conflicts
that bubble just below the surface. It may desiccate the intellectual
conversation at a law school by robbing the intellectual community of the
accumulated wisdom to be found in the religious traditions on matters of
critical importance to jurisprudence and justice - what the religious
traditions have come to discover about, for example, the relationship
between justice and forgiveness. 20  As just one case study for this
proposition, I think about some of the public writings emerging in response
to the political and social aftermath of September 11. Those who have the
theological resources to name the enormity of evils, both in and after that
event, have been able to speak in a much more telling way about what
confronts us as a society in a world of terror than those who are forced to
speak only out of secular resources.2'
Second, the Enlightenment understanding may disempower colleagues
who are in heated struggles with each other about contested issues such as
abortion, gun control, or even whether faculty pay should be based on
teaching or scholarship. They may be discouraged from discovering and
expressing their most deeply held values emanating from religious
understandings of the nature of the person and the nature of community
life. When one's most foundational rationales for passionately held views
are banished from the conversation, the old adage that some conversations
shed more heat than light is inevitably going to be true. Moreover, when
profoundly held beliefs cannot be fully shared, the problem that Wayne
Booth has identified about the modem skepticism about "hidden motives"
is likely to come into play.22 That is, colleagues engaged in a law school
power struggle may believe that their adversaries are using argument
simply to "put one over on them" by covering up their true motives for
making arguments. Such suspicions about hidden motives can be as strong
in contested debates about values as those in which faculty members
suspect that seemingly objective policies, e.g., on faculty productivity, are
simply a cover for some faculty members to get better salary packages or
status perks than their peers.
20. For citations and a more extended argument on this point, see Marie A. Failinger,
The Justice Who Wouldn't be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing the Wisdom of Faith Traditions,
46 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 643, 643-44, 649-60 (1998).
21. At the risk of unfairly singling any one secular commentary out for criticism,
compare, e.g., Desmond Tutu, Are We Ready to Forgive, at
http://www.beliefnet.com/story/88/story_8880_.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004), and U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, A Pastoral Message: Living With Faith and Hope After
September 11 (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/septll.htm (last visited
Apr. 7, 2004), with Shashi Tharoor, September 11, 2002: Understanding and Defeating
Terrorism, One Year Later, 27-SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 9 (2003).
22. See WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT 24-26, 34-
37 (1974).
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Finally, the banishment of religious language from the law school
community may be part of the banishment of all that is "personal" to law
faculty members. Although they share a lifetime of professional
community together, I doubt whether most faculty members can identify
their colleagues' children, much less understand much about their personal
struggles or joys, or even what they believe their legacy to the teaching
profession and to the world to be. As an offender in this regard, I can name
the sin.
The values of professional objectivity and the separation of
professional and personal life that faculty members teach their students by
modeling it in the classroom have salutary purposes: those values can
enable lawyers to serve their clients competently and objectively, without
melting down or raging into unhelpful tirades from the emotions generated
by a case. However, like the concept of the "separation of church and
state," I fear that law school communities have unconsciously carried these
values well beyond the purposes that they serve, into areas of common life
in the law school where such values are inimical to preserving community.
If we cannot talk about a law faculty member's religion any more than
about his or her children, then we signal to every member of the law school
community that he or she cannot really count on us when the chips are
down, when that faculty member confronts a personal crisis or the demons
connected with aging and questions of professional meaning.
II. OF NATURAL LAW, SERVANT-LEADER, AND SECTARIAN LAW SCHOOLS
A second group of religiously affiliated law schools display what we
might call a "natural law" character regarding the role of religion in law
schools. 23 At least some religious minority faculty members at these law
schools are comfortable with this view, because they effectively agree with
the assumptions of the natural law model. In my Lutheran tradition, this
view is to be described as the "two kingdoms" or more properly, the "two
governances" view24 about the mission and work of law schools. This
natural law model would agree with the notion that law is essentially a
"secular" enterprise in Luther's sense of the word - that is, not secular in
the sense of stripped of the divine, but secular in the sense of pertaining to
23. This is a somewhat different (Lutheran) argument than Tom Shaffer's distinction
between Erastian and sectarian Catholic law schools, see Shaffer, supra note 3, at 1864-70.
Shaffer understands Erastian theology as assuming that the civil community is essentially
Christian, and the church serves that whole, even those who do not consider themselves part
of the Church. An example he cites is the Anglican Establishment in England. Id. at 1866.
Shaffer argues that Erastian law schools generally function quite similarly to other law
schools, though they may support some non-secular research and writing, and permit more
religious discourse in the classroom. However, Erastian law schools would not see
themselves "merely as serving the state" but often "becomes a cheering section for state
violence." Id. at 1867-70.
24. See, e.g., George W. Forell, Luther's Conception of "Natural Orders," in MARTIN
LUTHER: THEOLOGIAN OF THE CHURCH 66,72-80 (WORD & WORLD SUPP. SERIES 2 1994).
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God's weltlich work - i.e., God's constantly changing activity in this
earthly life.2 ' This natural law model presumes that people of faith have no
particular or novel insight into what the demands of earthly existence
require - a faculty member's wise contributions to a law school's mission
and practice depend more on his or her moral and intellectual virtues than
his or her direct pipeline from faith tradition to daily work.
At such religiously affiliated law schools, particularistic religion,
especially religious argument that relies heavily on revelation or textual
literalism, is usually not deemed a relevant category for creating insiders or
outsiders as respects the school's mission. While certain basic theological
assumptions, such as that God created and continues to govern this earthly
life, are always the background for discussing law, they do not admit of any
specialized insights about legal education or other legal institutions. Thus,
there is no particular purpose to be served in raising them in a policy
discussion, either in the classroom or the faculty meeting. In this view,
anyone who employs practical wisdom to the task of legal education can be
persuasive as the next person, no matter what his or her religious
affiliation.
As with the Enlightenment model, this model is perhaps less likely
than others to demarcate on-the-surface divisions between insiders and
outsiders on the basis of faith tradition. It may effortlessly acknowledge
the value that minority religious faculty members can bring to the
discussion in shaping the mission and values of law and legal institutions.
Its great advantage over the Enlightenment model is that at natural law
schools, there is nothing inapt or shameful or odd about being an openly
faithful person. At these schools, students might regularly see faculty
going off to chapel, taking holy days off, praying, reading holy texts, or
even drawing from their faith when a student or colleague faces a critical
moment, such as a death or mental illness.
However, problems can arise for religious minorities at "natural law"
institutions that are not dissimilar to those arising at Enlightenment-style
institutions where discussion of religion is discouraged. For one thing,
religious faculty members who are not fully reflective about what we
Lutherans call the difference between the "right-hand" governance, or the
life of salvation, and the "left-hand governance," decision-making on
matters of earthly life including jurisprudence,26 may inadvertently and
unreflectively bring theological judgments from the "right-hand"
governance into their solution of "left-hand" governance problems without
explicitly pronouncing them. One example might be a law school's stance
about teaching professionalism: faculty members might easily confuse the
question of what lawyers must do to be ethical with the question of what
lawyers must do to be saved.
25. Id. at 77.
26. Id. at 71-72, 78-82.
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Such unthinking borrowing from religious tradition may confuse those
minority faculty and students not privy to the background assumptions of
the tradition. In turn, if minority faculty members display any confusion
about or seeming dissent from "right-hand" assumptions, majority faculty
members may be quick to assume that a minority faculty member is not
competent in matters presumed to be accessible and indeed obvious to any
thinking person. In fact, some majority faculty members may come to the
conclusion that a religious outsider "will never understand" and thus can
never be fully trusted as an equal in critical mission debates.
Second, to the extent that the religiously affiliated legal institution
visibly retains its "right-hand" governance affiliation, parts of its life may
continue to be tied to the religious or social rituals peculiar to its own faith
tradition. Virtually every faith tradition, no matter how apparently
universal, has rituals that, even when they are not intended to exclude,
necessarily do exclude because they grow out of a faith community
gathered around a shared tradition and evidence a commitment not fully
extended to outsiders. Having had an outsider's privilege of observing
others' ritual traditions from American Indian tobacco ceremonies to bar
mitzvahs, I believe that it is virtually impossible for limited and sinful
human beings to participate in a ritual community without creating a
divide, however modest, between insiders and outsiders, no matter how
gracious and welcoming the community may strive to be. For example, at
Valparaiso University School of Law where I received my J.D., even
though there was little direct mention of religious concerns in the
classroom, the religious services at the massive chapel just across the lawn
from our law school served, at least once a day, to mark faithful Lutherans
(and those other Christians who felt comfortable attending) from others
who attended our school. It was certainly not a pervasive or oppressive
divide for others, but it was still a divide.
Indeed, cultural rituals may be the most excluding, precisely because
they purport to be more universal, unlike worship rituals that everyone
expects to mark the boundary between inside and outside. Catholic jokes
about Sister so-and-so or Lutheran jokes about confirmation day and
hotdish suppers can be more excluding than worship because they are
based on a social history that an outsider cannot even learn about in books
and yet one that he is expected to appreciate, laughing at all the appropriate
moments. Indeed, sometimes it is the very exclusivity of these insider
jokes or stories that makes them delicious to humans - even the most
gracious among us enjoy sharing secret wisdom or insider experiences that
by definition exclude others.
In a law school environment where religion is thought to be not
necessary to any discussion because it is not pertinent to our "left-hand
governance" work, the religious majority's communal ritual behavior will
make outsiders' status in the community quite unclear. In reality, like the
antics of "Our Gang" in the secret clubhouse, the appearance to minorities
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that being a religious insider confers status in the law school community
may well be vastly out of proportion to reality. Nevertheless, the
perception that some are more privy to the goods of the institution because
they participate in majority rituals and culture may be hard for some
minority members to shake, particularly if they have lived a lifetime of
being excluded from "the club," starting with whether they celebrated
Christmas as kids. Of course, religion is not the only tie that creates an
"insider-outsider" effect - first-generation professionals, women, racial
minorities, academics who grew up in rural areas, sexual minorities and
others often report this same sense that they are working in a culturally
foreign country.2" Nevertheless, at a religious institution, minorities might
understandably be particularly sensitive to their identification as an
outsider.
A third, closely related model for the role of religion in religiously
affiliated law schools might be characterized as a "servant-leader"
approach. In this view, to which at least some Protestant traditions
subscribe, what matters is not so much one's (or one's institution's)
particular theology, but as the way that theology manifests itself in one's
work on behalf of others. My own Methodist law school at least at times
seems to enact this model.
On the positive side, the "servant-leader" approach has much to
commend it as a model of integrating religious majority and minority
faculty. By focusing on what lawyers should be doing, rather than from
what faith tradition they approach law, the servant-leader law school model
can emphasize in practical ways that, as a community of professionals, we
can cooperate in serving human beings and justice no matter what our
particular religious or political leanings may be. Such a tradition
emphasizes the common values and civility necessary in a leadership class,
part of whose responsibility is to lead very bitter cultural debates into
practical decision-making that will inevitably violate deeply cherished
beliefs of some members of the polity; and even to help settle such hotly
contested matters as whether Civil Procedure and Contracts should be
taught in five credits or six.
However, like the other models, the "servant-leader" approach has its
drawbacks. First, this approach, like the natural law or Enlightenment
approach, may begin with the idea that it is distasteful even to speak about
faculty members' religious traditions, because of the belief that they should
be judged on their "works" rather than identified by their religious
affiliations. Second, this approach may elide conflict by suggesting that
everyone, no matter what faith tradition (including none) can buy into the
work of the law school without agreeing upon the values that inform social
justice. Without some agreement on such values, however, debates about
27. My thanks to my colleague Angela McCaffrey for first framing the substance of
this insight.
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what counts as service to the community when faculty members (or
students) are involved in pro bono work or scholarship can become more
visceral-reaction-fests than serious intellectual discussions.
A servant-leader approach to the role of religious discussion in the law
school counts upon modeling rather than reflection to lead to ethical
behavior; but just as reflection alone cannot be trusted to make us moral,
modeling cannot be fully trusted either. As faculty members know from
experience, as much as we might try to model ethical lives, if we fail to
teach our students the necessity of lifelong reflection upon their deepest
commitments, we write a recipe for professional conformity at the least,
and moral failure at the worst. So too, a natural law or servant-leader
approach that describes a law school's mission in the broadest terms while
failing to reflect on what the religious traditions have learned about moral
dilemmas will often provide little guidance or moral encouragement to
faculty members in making tough moral decisions about mission itself.
Thus, as with Enlightenment law schools, "natural law" or "servant-
leader" law schools that begin with the premise that different faith
traditions have nothing useful to contribute to the law may find that
bleaching out the particulars will have very practical negative effects on
defining and implementing a law school's mission. As with any other
attempt to define what people in a community hold in common that does
not rely on particularistic strategies such as telling a community's story or
analogizing from individual experiences, creating or implementing a
mission without lifting up particulars of faculty and staff experience risks
being insipid.
My argument can be illustrated by any faculty meeting dedicated to
revising the school mission statement. Without a clear understanding of
defining law school values, those of us not as capable of the brilliant
abstraction as say, Kant, are almost doomed to write mission statements
that convey nothing of importance about a law school's mission, or else
raise the uncomfortable question whether the law school should even stay
in business since its mission statement sounds a lot like every competitor
school's mission. Searching for the least common denominator among the
faculty in terms of ethical and social values might make it appear that
religious minorities are being integrated into the mission of the law school,
but a more honest reading is probably that "there is no there there" - there
is no real mission into which religious minority faculty or anybody else can
actually be integrated.
Moreover, in the absence of the ability to describe in particular ways,
through the language and history of traditions, what drives the work of a
law school community, law schools can easily lose a sense of communal
purpose and courage, and come to exist largely for their members' own
comfort and security. Again, by way of illustration, one can conjure up
those defining moments when the strategic plan needs to be revised, and
the law faculty has to choose whether to spend resources to gain a better
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standing with the U.S. News and World Report or to further founding
values - for example, a mission to educate competent, caring and
indispensable attorneys who find their vocation in dealing with clients'
routine legal needs, but who may not be skilled in making a Yale law
student's brilliant abstractions. A mission approach that does not employ
the particulars of religious traditions as well as other values and
experiences is unlikely to steer the conversation in the unpopular direction.
It seems to me that, to some extent, the integrative antidote in natural
law and servant-leader schools is to encourage faculty members to tell
stories from their faith traditions more often and not less. Those stories
should be told in both in formal settings such as websites and conferences,
but also in informal conversations with colleagues and students. While
narrative has come to be a clich6 in the legal academy, the fact is that story-
telling often will de-privilege initial majoritarian assumptions because the
tellers are forced to articulate hidden assumptions through concrete events,
images and feelings. Encouraging faculty members to tie abstract ideas to
particulars, to compare and analogize their own experiences with those of
others, asks them to risk equality as well as to claim it as a value.
A conversation in which everyone has to begin by saying, "my story is
this ... what is your story?" offers the prospect of clearing away some of
the mystery of the "Our Gang" clubhouse and laying bare some of the
hidden assumptions of the institution while inviting religious and other
minorities to share their own assumptions and values. And story-telling
does not eliminate the hope that consensus or good action can result, even
in situations of profound conflict. If nothing else, stories may motivate us
to act on our convictions, not simply to spout them, because of the passions
they uncover.
A final law school model, often referred to as the "sectarian" model,
begins with the premise that to talk about God and what God commands,
expects, ordains in law (and law schools) is as essential as (indeed more
essential than) to talk about what the Supreme Court commands, expects,
or ordains.28  In this model, religion supplies a distinctive truth that
necessarily governs the nature of just law, 9 one that is accessible to others
28. Again, my typology defines sectarian law schools somewhat differently than
Shaffer's. Shaffer's sectarian law school would focus not on what its responsibilities for the
wider society are, but on "obedience to its Lord" and the service to society that results when
it does obey. Shaffer, supra note 3, at 1870. He identifies four qualities of a sectarian law
school: it would be communal, "would view the practice of law ... as a commissioned
ministry," would depend upon "infallible[] assurance" and would address particular
professional behavior. Id. at 1871-72.
29. For an example of the intellectual argument underpinning such schools' missions,
see David K. DeWolf & Robert John Araujo, And God's Justice Shall Become Ours:
Reflections on Teaching Law in a Catholic University, 11 REGENT U. L. REv. 37, 37-38
(1998-99) (arguing that "the realization that everything depends on God's transcendent truth
lies at the heart of seeking and doing justice" and "the more we have sought to understand
who we are and what our lives in the law should be, the more we have encountered the
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only to the extent that they come to fully understand, or even embrace, the
particular theological demands placed upon the law. In this model, not to
speak to, and about, God in the law school and in jurisprudence is an
affront to God and to the truth. Thus, prayer and theological reflection are
not only a necessary part of the law school community members' spiritual
life, they are a necessary part of the discussions that law schools carry on
about justice. This model, perhaps rarely fully embraced, is most criticized
by persons afraid of exclusivist and hegemonic religions.
I think it is fair to expect that religious minorities may potentially feel
themselves to be outsiders more in such law school communities than
others. After all, these communities want very much to link both the truth
and the right to a particular understanding of the will of God. It would be
difficult for even the most generous religious minority not to feel at times
personally and professionally judged as unacceptable by a law school
environment where his journey to the truth and God was categorically
excluded as an option.
I use the term "potential" for exclusion on purpose, because, based on
my limited knowledge of them, sectarian law school communities, like all
of the others, vary widely in their ability to embrace the richness that the
religiously Other has to offer their community, and to exhibit true respect,
not just tolerance, for his or her Otherness. Indeed, much as so-called
"fundamentalists," and "liberals" in the world's religions today seem to
share more with their "fundamentalist" and "liberal" counterparts in other
religions than with their own co-religionists, law schools' attitudes about
celebrating the Otherness of religious minorities seemingly have little to do
with whether they are Enlightenment-style, natural law, servant-leader or
sectarian law schools. Rather, the embrace of minority religionists seems
to have more to do with how faculty and students understand the
relationship between their fundamental commitments (including their
understanding of God's creative work) and human diversity. My
conversations and others' scholarship suggests to me that those law schools
claiming to be most inclusivist can be as intolerant and arrogant as any in
refusing to embrace the ideological or theological Other. Conversely,
sectarians may be among the first to rejoice in and embrace the willingness
of religious minorities in their midst to speak of and act on their distinctive
freeing truth that is God and His ultimate, true justice."). See also Jeffrey A. Brauch, It
Sounded Great in the Glossy Brochure... So Where Is It? Carrying out the Mission at a
Mission Driven School, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 2 (2001) (describing Regent's mission "[t]o
integrate biblical principles into the substance of the law we teach" and "[t]o train and
mentor students to bring a Christian perspective to bear on the way they live and practice
law").
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religious beliefs,3° considering them fellow travelers in the project of
returning God to a proper place in public life.
Of course, the real complications come in with the possible variations
on these themes, when, for example, a sectarian law professor gets hired at
a natural law institution, and so forth. While the limitations of this article
do not permit me to speculate on possible issues that these pairings might
create, let me close by listing some perhaps obvious, but basic ethical (and
practical) requirements for any law school that hopes to integrate religious
minorities into its work.
Confession or informed consent: As one of my resondents and any
number of writers on this subject have suggested,3  confessing our
positions - or, in secular terms, informed consent - is a minimum. First,
it is a matter of fairness - like other workers these days, law faculty make
a substantial reliance investment in their choice of law schools, and if they
make a wrong choice based on bad information, it may be very difficult for
them to find a new position at a place that is compatible with their
understanding of their vocation. If there is indeed a religious ethos and
basic set of expectations at a religiously affiliated law school, it should be
conveyed to prospective faculty members so they can decide whether they
are willing to "buy in" according to the role that religious minorities play in
that law school.
The unspoken problem with the "informed consent" principle is that
law faculties cannot honestly inform prospective members until they
themselves actually talk about what being a religiously affiliated law
school means to them. This, in turn, requires majority faculty members and
others to be self-reflective and even self-critical about the ways in which
their religious traditions might unconsciously affect their approach to law
school mission and governance. (Giving the question to a committee has
not seemed to be a successful approach to ensure that this discussion makes
a difference, however). For example, if a servant-leader law school expects
its faculty members, of whatever faith tradition, to devote a substantial
amount of time to "good works," it should not tell new faculty members
that their chief responsibility beyond teaching is to produce scholarship in
top-25 law reviews. Even at the level of basics - how an absence from
class or events is going to be viewed by colleagues and the powers that be
if it is for religious reasons - faculty members as well as students need to
be informed about what terrain they are likely to encounter.
Welcome Mats: In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,32 Justice
Stevens colorfully distinguished between a "welcome mat" that institutions
30. See, e.g., Brauch, supra note 29, at 2-3 (noting the broad representation of
Christians from a wide variety of denominations from Presbyterian and Baptist, to Roman
Catholic, Pentecostal and Mennonite on its faculty).
31. As just an example, see Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 13.
32. 515 U.S. 200, 244 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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can hold out to minority candidates and a "no trespassing sign." If law
faculties, after examining themselves, actually do prize religious diversity,
it is important for them to think about how they are going to put out the
welcome mat for religious minorities. As with affirmative action, visibility
is a big part of the picture. A law school that advertises the faith
commitments of its faculty members - as reflected in matters such as
religious dress and observance, faculty pro bono work and scholarship - is
going to tell prospective faculty, students and members of the larger
community much more about how likely it is that their faith tradition is
welcomed than any documents on diversity lying around in the associate
dean's office. A dean's letter that highlights a faculty member's service to
his church or religious community as well as to the ABA or AALS, or a
school website that advertises a faculty article on religious traditions and
law, when it is thoughtfully paired with similar activities in other faith
traditions, will do more to put out the welcome mat to religious minorities
than any abstract commitment to diversity.
Second, good hosts and hostesses, like good family members, are
sensitive to cues, verbal and not, that guests or other family members have
unique needs not met by even the most seemingly universal practices and
policies. Just as preparing only steak and then inviting known vegetarians
to dinner signals that a host does not care very much about his guests,
administrators who implement school policies can give the same message
that a minority faculty member is not seen and heard. This can be equally
true when administrators claim that they cannot make exceptions for
religious needs as when the practices are continued simply as a matter of
habit - for example, scheduling faculty meetings on late Friday
afternoons.
Sensitivity to such concerns depends on institutionalizing awareness
of difference. Regular training and explicit written direction to line staff
about what kinds of concerns applicants, students, faculty and staff of
minority religious persuasions may have is just as essential as discussions
at faculty meetings. It is just as critical that the dean's secretary who orders
food for receptions or banquets knows that if she must order pork (which
might offend some Buddhists), she needs to give orders that it cannot touch
the rest of the food on the deli tray (for Muslims) and that she knows she
should avoid serving a meat entree with ice cream (for observant Jews).
Most administrative staff members, in my experience, are very thoughtful
about other people's needs if only they have an adequate information base
to ask. And most religious minorities are only too happy both to instruct
others about their religious needs and to understand when the
accommodations made for them must be compromises to reflect others'
interests and wishes.
Good hosts and caring family members are also willing to sacrifice for
others' benefit, something that is sometimes difficult for law faculty
members who are used to having significant amounts of control over their
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working environment. For example, valuing diversity means that
Christians must be prepared to take late Friday afternoon and Saturday
classes so that their Jewish colleagues can celebrate Shabbat, and Jews and
secular faculty will end up teaching Sundays so the Christians can go to
church. Similarly, each of them must be willing to help out Muslims on
holy days, just as they do when a colleague has a conference or other
professional commitment.33  Respecting diversity means growing in
sensitivity toward others' religious needs. That means considering, for
example, whether you will hold conferences on Saturdays because it is the
most convenient for non-Jews, or whether you will buy a prayer rug and
make time in the Friday schedule for Muslim prayer, to mention only two
potential conflicts for minority religious faculty.
The Beginning of Respect is Knowledge: Third - and this seems so
obvious and yet so honored in the breach - majority law faculty members
need to educate themselves about other religions so they can have at least
minimally informed conversations with their colleagues about how their
faith traditions influence their work. In selecting what religious work will
inform their study, they need to be sensitive to both the appearance of
inclusiveness and the real dynamics that result from creating a "clubhouse"
atmosphere in the law school with those of similar religious traditions
leading the way on study of the tradition's work. They need to
acknowledge these realities both to themselves and to their minority
colleagues, even if it has to take the form of humorous self-deprecation to
be comfortable.
Knowing something of others' traditions places demands on law
faculty in two areas where they are least generous: their time and their
intellectual vulnerability. Knowing other religious traditions demands that
faculty take precious hours away from their own academic interests to
focus on traditions that might not have otherwise sparked their intellectual
curiosity. The demand to know others' traditions also threatens faculty
members' need for mastery over what they know and assurance that they
are speaking authoritatively, for few religious majority faculty members
will ever be able to learn enough to speak about minority religious
traditions without humility and error. But this has to be done.
To make minority religious traditions part of the fabric of a religiously
affiliated institution, these conversations need to go beyond the bounds of
the faculty. Student and alumni ignorance and prejudice about minority
religious faiths may be almost as likely to undermine a school's inclusive
efforts as faculty ignorance. For example, alumni may bring their influence
to bear when a dean candidate who does not share the faith tradition of the
school is being considered - that influence may be as helpful as asking the
faculty and staff to consider how the dean will help further the mission of
33. Indeed, I owe a debt of gratitude to my colleague Mary Jane Morrison for taking
my Saturday class so I could attend this conference.
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the school, and as insidious as unreflective prejudices about persons from
certain religious backgrounds.
I feel that I am veering into recitation of the obvious here. But, as
obvious as it is, I see very little attention to these matters occurring in
religiously affiliated law schools, including my own, no matter which
model of religious affiliation they embrace. Yet, the matter of educating
ourselves about religious traditions and reflecting on what it means to be a
religiously affiliated law school need not be an additional "task force"
burden imposed on faculty members. It can begin with actions as simple
as:
_ yearly attention to the question of what the school's and faculty's
religious traditions can contribute to an understanding of the law school
mission at scheduled faculty retreats or faculty meetings. Religious ideas
can serve not just as the main topic for conversation, but as a lens through
which faculty can view any particular issue they face, whether it is program
proposals or how to teach students to be ethical leaders. However, such
regular reflection will require that the faculty give the dean, and/or one or
more members of the faculty, the "permission" to be the voice that
regularly raises these questions, just as every faculty has a colleague who
can be counted on to bring up diversity, ethics, or academic freedom
concerns with regard to other challenges the school faces;
- dissemination to all faculty of colleagues' scholarly work that is
tied to their faith traditions or reflects on the mission of religiously
affiliated law schools, so that individual faculty members have some
"meaty" ideas around which to reflect on their own vocational journeys.
The same faculty forums that consider teaching methods and works-in-
progress could consider these issues as well, perhaps most effectively if the
faculty had scholarly readings to attend to the questions;
- some administrative attention to the question of religiously
informed mission when all-school speakers are chosen, and, when it is
possible, diverting speakers who come to campus to talk with faculty
groups about how their own religious experience has shaped their work;
- providing opportunities for faculty and alums, in small faith circles
or in email discussion groups or CLE events, to give the law school
feedback about the extent to which these issues were visible to them
throughout their law school career, and to continue the conversation about
what their faith tradition means to them in their work. Majority faculty
members can usefully gain from these conversations, not only for general
issues of mission but also to understand their minority colleagues that much
better; and
- expanding opportunities in the regular curriculum where faculty
members discuss religious traditions, "regular" law and professional
vocation with their students. My colleague Howard Vogel's professional
responsibility seminars are exemplary in this respect, but there is no reason
that students should not be encouraged to bring theological insights into
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Criminal Law class or even Evidence. Even those faculty members who do
not feel comfortable professing their own faith because of their influence
on students can bring richness to the classroom by presenting views of
Jews, Muslims, Christians and others on issues from abortion to lending
money, always subject to their willingness to be open to correction.
III. PILGRIMAGE AND EXODUS: DECONSTRUCTING MY OWN WORK
As my little survey suggests, much of an institution's character is not
dependent on Big Ideas about religious affiliation, but upon the character of
real law faculty members - how they live out habits of respect and
hospitality in the daily ways that influence how faculty members feel "at
home" in our own institutions. I am too Lutheran not to acknowledge that
law school faculties are no different from any other sinners in the ways in
which they misuse or neglect to properly use their power to create inclusive
environments, just as they misuse and neglect their office in dealings with
students and staff by creating hierarchies of worth, neglecting others in
their hour of need, and denying their complicity in institutional evil.
Indeed, religious law faculty members, even at religious law schools, are
no less sinners insofar as they deny their responsibility for the creation -
deny the responsibility for achieving justice even when students, alumni,
guest speakers and others bring those stories of injustice to their very doors.
I can name these sins as one who participates in them.
Even so, I might suggest that looking at the question of integration
theologically provides a more hopeful prospect for surmounting the sinful
limitations that we bring to the project of integration than any committee or
any lists of projects as I have outlined might produce. The theological
images of pilgrimage and exodus provide resonant and deconstructing
means for our reflection on the problem of "integrating" minority religious
faculty at majority institutions.
Imagining our lifelong journey as members of a law faculty on
pilgrimage, to be sure, takes some imagination, though not as much as it
used to. Twenty years ago, one prominent paradigm for promising law
teachers was the "corporate" career: it was assumed that the most ambitious
would begin their teaching careers at lesser-known law schools, rise to
prominence via major research university law schools and thence to Ivy
League or other elite institutions. Due to increasing supply and decreasing
demand, this image, if it ever really existed, has disappeared for all but a
few of the best and brightest, much like the similar life trajectory of other
corporate climbers. Indeed, increasingly, mobile legal academics are more
like traditional pilgrims - wandering around from one school to the next
on visiting assignments, some of them waiting for a school to see their
indispensability and to grant them a tenure-eligible slot and a home.
Tenure-track faculty members, on the other hand, make their professional
journeys with the same colleagues for thirty or more years.
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If then increasingly law faculties are companies of lifelong fellow
travelers not along the Route 66 of academic fame and fortune, but along a
perilous highway of U.S. News rankings and admissions downturns, we
may wonder why the metaphor of pilgrimage has so easily escaped our
notice, especially at religiously affiliated law schools. Imagining our
journey as majority and minority religious law faculty members through
dangerous straits is not so difficult in an age where the future of our
institutions is hardly assured, much less our own tenure in them.
The metaphor of pilgrimage is not just a universal one, but also one
that has a distinctive American resonance. In terms of world religions, the
pilgrimage is a ritual important to the life of virtually all religious
traditions, from Christianity and Islam to Hinduism and Judaism.
3  In
some traditions, the pilgrimage is a central ritual; in others, its prominence
has depended very much on status and wealth in some centuries, and on
ethnicity and regional understandings of piety in others. In Islam, of
course, the hajj is a mandatory rite for every Muslim who is capable of
making it, at least once in his lifetime; and the Prophet himself instituted
the basic outlines of the ritual that modern-day Muslims undergo.
35 But the
pilgrimage is not exclusive to Western traditions: American Indians
continue to conduct religious ceremonies, often secret extensive
experiential trials, in those sacred mountains or other sites where their
people are thought to have originated.
36 Australian aborigines memorialize
the heroic feats of the heads of their clans by visits to sacred sites where
these events occurred; and in Afghanistan, migrating nomads seasonally
halt to pray at the tombs of pious men whose good works have become
legend. 7
In America, the distinctively English Protestant understanding of
pilgrimage was virtually a founding metaphor in the New England
colonies. Founding religious leaders were eager to compare their journeys
from the Old World to Abraham's wandering from "a centre of civilisation
34. See Luigi Tomasi, Homo Viator: From Pilgrimage to Religious Tourism Via the
Journey, in FROM MEDIEVAL PILGRIMAGE TO RELIGIOUS TOURISM: THE SOCIAL 
AND
CULTURAL ECONOMICS OF PIETY 4 (William H. Swatos, Jr. & Luigi Tomasi eds., 2002)
[hereinafter FROM MEDIEVAL PILGRIMAGE TO RELIGIOUS TOURISM]. Tomasi notes that
centers of pilgrimages have been known since antiquity, from Delphi in Greece, to ancient
Egypt. Sites that attract multiple religious groups range from Jerusalem, to St. Francis
Xavier's tomb in Goa and Adam's Peak in Sri Lanka, which both attract Christian, Hindu
and Muslim pilgrims. Even the powerful Romans had a tradition of pilgrimage to thank the
Gods. Id. at3-4, 11-12.
35. THOMAS W. LIPPMAN, UNDERSTANDING ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MUSLIM
WORLD 22 (2d ed. 1995).
36. See, e.g. Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative
Approach to Cultural Conflict over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 780-81 (2001) (describing rituals at Chimney Rock, the place of
World Renewal "whose purpose is the stabilization and preservation of the earth from
catastrophe, and of mankind from disease"). Id. at 780.
37. Tomasi, supra note 34, at 7.
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and from his family... to live as a nomadic tent-dweller in 'the foreign and
hostile land of Canaan,"' and the Exodus was similarly a seminal metaphor
for the New England migration.38 To come to America was to make the
long and perilous journey in the name of the mysterious will of God, "the
race for the prize of the crown of salvation., 39 "To make such a reckless
decision and to insist on undertaking so foolhardy a journey argues an
audacious and intrepid character," the Puritans suggested.40 The risk of the
adventure was not only physical, but spiritual - in the view of these
spiritual forefathers, it would be difficult for the New Americans to get
through the narrow way, to negotiate the rocks of spiritual temptation on
either side.4 '
We might focus on three key idealistic themes of the pilgrimage that
resonate in the self-understanding of a religiously affiliated law faculty:
themes of oneness and community, of self-abnegation and of
transformation. One of the great observers of pilgrimages around the
world, John Turner, suggests that pilgrimages "homogenize" status and by
severing ties to one's home position, "level[] status differences and role
structures" so "[a]ttachments form among the pilgrims themselves and the
communities around them., 42 In Islam, the focus on community is perhaps
most palpable, the message of the hajj is an experience of oneness with
fellow Muslims, a sense of the whole umma coming together in worship of
Allah and in remembrance of their history as a people of God.43 Moreover,
the ritual of the hajj, which clothes everyone in the same white garments
and takes everyone through the same symbolic re-enactment of the
Prophet's journey, is meant to demonstrate the equality of pilgrims in their
faith.44  So too the traditional Christian pilgrimage was meant to
demonstrate the oneness of the Body of Christ - the wealthy as much as
the poor took their turn genuflecting at the sacred sites that made up the
pilgrimage.45 And the Exodus is, as well, a story of the transformation of
individual Jewish slaves, who live isolated, unseen lives in wealthy
Egyptian households into a free and equal people. In the ancient Passover
38. N.H. Keeble, 'To Be a Pilgrim': Constructing the Protestant Life in Early Modern
England, in PILGRIMAGE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE FROM BECKET TO BuNYAN 248-49
(Colin Morris & Peter Roberts eds., 2002).
39. Id. at 255.
40. Id. at 252.
41. Id. at253-54.
42. Lutz Kaelber, The Sociology of Medieval Pilgrimage: Contested Views and
Shifting Boundaries, in FROM MEDIEVAL PILGRIMAGE TO RELIGIOUS TOURISM, supra note
34, at 52.
43. See SUZANNE HANEEF, WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ISLAM AND
MUSLIMS 64-65 (1996); LIPPMAN, supra note 35, at 22-23. The hajj also represents the
unity of the person, whose body, mind, soul, time, status, and even individuality is
subsumed into worship. HANEEF, supra, at 62.
44. See HANEEF, supra note 43, at 63.
45. Id. at 3.
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pilgrimage, which drew the entire Jewish nation to crowd into Jerusalem,
there was "an unparalleled feeling of belonging and brotherhood that
encompassed all the participants . .. [and] Jerusalem veritably rang out
with song and the holy, intense celebration of life lived in religious
freedom and Divine purpose.1
46
Second, the traditional pilgrimage in most religious faiths is a time not
only for expression of the unity and equality of the faithful, but also a time
for renunciation and personal self-abnegation. Pilgrims are instructed, in
the devotional books of many religions, to prepare for their journeys by
giving up those creature comforts or material possessions which are
important to them, on which their daily lives hang.
47 The preparations
made before the journey signaled that pilgrims were undergoing a "civil
death. 4 8  Pilgrims would intensively prepare spiritually for the arduous
journey by foot across hundreds or thousands of miles, steeling themselves
for dangers and deprivations, an undertaking today equaled only by those
few we hail as extreme adventurers. 
49
46. THE TEMPLE INSTITUTE, The Festival of Passover: "Time of Our Freedom," at
http://www.templeinstitute.org/services/Passover.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). Modem
Jewish pilgrimages are not limited to Biblical sites; many Jewish pilgrims visit the
birthplaces of ancient sages or centers of Jewish learning. See, e.g., More Than 1,000
Jewish Pilgrims Visit Jerba, Tunisia, Islam for Today, at
http://www.islamfortoday.com/jewishpilgrimage.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
47. Tomasi, supra note 34, at 5; Keeble, supra note 38, at 247-48, 251-52.
48. Tomasi, supra note 34, at 6. Tomasi notes that medieval law provided for a
pilgrim to be declared dead when a year and a day had passed without word of him, in part
to recognize how dangerous pilgrimages actually were, because of violence and illness. Id.
49. See Kaelber, supra note 42, at 58. Kaelber notes that preparation for departure
could begin months before a pilgrimage, involving rituals of contrition and confession,
making a will, giving to charity, and donning distinctive garb. To understand how amazing
these rituals of pilgrimage were for medieval Christians - and are in at least some faith
traditions such as Hinduism or Buddhism today - we need to stretch our minds to imagine
something that is quite outside the experience of the modem West. In the year 2000, more
than two million Muslims converged in ninety-nine degree heat, on Mount Arafat outside
Mecca to pray and read the Qur'an; until modem times, the journey to Mecca would have
had to be made by foot, or animal rides. See Bassem Mroue, Muslim Pilgrims Pray for
Forgiveness at Mount Ararat, THE DETROIT NEWS, March 15, 2000, available at
http://www.detnews.com/2000/religion/000
3/15/3160011 .htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003);
SACHIKO MURATA & WILLIAM C. CHITTICK, THE VISION OF ISLAM 19 (1994). But the
magnitude of such pilgrimages is not simply a function of convenient modem travel and the
size of the global population. Some academics believe that 500 years before Christ, as
many as one million Jewish pilgrims would flock to Jerusalem three times a year to observe
the Pesach, Shavous, and the feast of Tabernacles, living in vast tent cities. In medieval
times, Jews would walk from Germany and Poland to be part of one of these "three-foot"
festivals, hence the name "Drei-fuss," Dreyfus, for those who undertook the journey. See
Campbell Simon, Israel, a Tourist Spot? Heck, Dwellers in the Holy Land Practically
Invited the Industry, at http://www.jewishworldreview.comi0598/touristsl.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2003). Traffic of Christian pilgrims to the East was so heavy that the Venetian
administration had to intervene in 1392 to ensure that the ships used to transport European
Christians to the Holy Land were seaworthy. Tomasi, supra note 34, at 6. We modems
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Third, the chief aim of the traditional pilgrimage, unlike modem
Western religious tourism, was not to take in and experience a holy site, but
rather to transform one's inward parts, to receive absolution as well as
enlightenment. Pilgrims in at least some traditions expected a liminal
experience - they were to escape the confines of their old lives either for a
transitory transcendent experience, or a permanently life-changing
journey. Pilgrims gave up their property because there was no need for it
in the new and altered life they planned to live upon their return. Indeed,
hardened criminals as well as ordinary penitents often joined medieval
pilgrimages, because they represented perhaps the only path for these
criminals to become "new persons," to atone for what they had done by
putting off their old selves and taking on new lives that would allow them
to be accepted back into the community."
This transformation was not only outward, but also inward - as the
preparatory rituals suggested. Thus, pilgrimage authors speak of an
"external pilgrimage" that moves focused persons to a revered place of
contemplation, as well as an "interior pilgrimage," a metaphor of the
transformation of the individual to a "particular condition of holiness or
healing," often from a "spiritless or degrading position to one held in
relatively high esteem." 52
These three experiences - the experience of the unity and equality of
the collective, the sense of self-sacrifice and self-abnegation, and the notion
that the journey is not only an exterior journey of a professional life but an
interior transformation - all carry some resonance for an imagination of a
law faculty attempting to live faithful to a religious mission. First, even in
secular law school communities, despite our perennial and stubborn
demands for professional independence, the themes of community and
equality that we sound in our loftier law school publications and model in
our governance sound at least in small part on these pilgrimage themes.
They repeat that we are all equal professional brothers and sisters on this
journey into the unknown, despite differences in rank and renown. The
equality of the faculty, from the dean down to the newest member, is
sometimes a value more honored in the breach; but it offers a compelling
demand on the way in which we imagine our work together.
would have to imagine hundreds of thousands of people following Ann Bancroft's thousand-
mile dogsled journey across the ice caps of the South Pole or joining Thor Heyerdahl's
4,300-mile expedition from Peru to the South Pacific.
50. See Kaelber, supra note 42, at 52.
51. Tomasi, supra note 34, at 8 (citing S. TENDERINI, OSPITALIA SUI PASSI ALPINI:
VIAGGIO ATTRAVERSO LE ALPI, DA ANIBALE ALL CONTRORIFORMA 97-98 (2000) (noting
that the practice of sending criminals on pilgrimage had to be discontinued in the 14th
century to prevent wayfarers from being overrun with criminals disguised as penitents).
52. See Michael York, Contemporary Pagan Pilgrimages, in FROM MEDIEVAL
PILGRIMAGE TO RELIGIOUS TOURISM: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ECONOMICS OF PIETY,
supra note 34, at 137-38.
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Second, our professional journeys as lawyers and as law faculty
members resemble in trivial ways as well as more profoundly the tone of
self-abnegation and contrition that medieval pilgrims might display on their
journey to a favored shrine. On the trivial end, some of us are eager to
point out, to any who will hear, how much money we might have made in
private practice, and how we have sacrificed in order to serve the public
and our own students. Especially for those coming from lucrative private
practices, the evidence that law faculty members are foregoing well-earned
worldly goods for some higher journey toward the truth can be quite
immediate. Even the way in which we perceive ourselves, as scholars
whose responsibility is to exercise frequent bouts of self-criticism, both
about our teaching and about our scholarly ideas, resonates with a
penitential model in our arduous struggle toward a just society.
In religiously affiliated law schools, moreover, the emphasis on
quality teaching and mentoring of our students and on community service
carries with it a sort of narrative of self-abnegation which is distinctively
different from the public secular narrative about legal education. In the
secular narrative, the successful law faculty member is one who, while he
or she may also be a good teacher, is primarily focused on scholarship that
will profoundly influence the very theory of law for decades to come, and
also decisively affect its immediate shape in court decisions, legislative
efforts, and even administrative reforms. In many religiously affiliated
schools' narratives, however, the successful faculty member is the one who
strives earnestly to be an accessible and challenging teacher, whose office
door is always open. In these law schools, the good law teacher might
spend much of his or her free time in committee work sustaining the life of
the law school or university, or working for unsung and more pedestrian
pro bono causes unrecognized in the elite academy, such as taking legal aid
pro bono cases or helping a state bar or legislature draft a policy. Still, this
work carries a mixed message: like the saintly pilgrim, the admiration
expressed for these saintly teachers by those who have taken the more
traditional secular path might well be accompanied with pity or even
condescension, with the subtext that a teaching/service faculty member has
given his professional life away instead of living it to the fullest.
Third, religiously affiliated law schools take more seriously, by talk
about responsibilities to model an ethical life to students, that their law
faculty members are on a journey that changes character, not simply one
that juggles ideas. Most of the time, of course, we talk about how our law
school experience is designed to change students' characters, to help them
grow into conscientious and ethical lawyers who are different from
"secular" lawyers in their adherence to higher ethical standards and
willingness to serve the public good. Yet, among many faculty at
religiously affiliated institutions, there is a hope that their experience of the
distinctive community gathered around a religious tradition will, if it does
not transform their own character over a lifetime of professional teaching
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and service, at least strengthen those aspects of their character that they
attribute to the difference faith makes in their lives.
My colleague Howard Vogel writes about the task of teaching our
students how to live out of vocation using a text of wandering, the Exodus,
as his framework. He would have us imagine that lawyers are wandering
in the wilderness of our professional lives, a place seemingly barren of the
hope of personal or ultimate meaning. Absent some way to find or make
meaning, the practice of law can become a desert that poses the same
temptations as the children of Israel or the children of pilgrimage
encounter. There is the temptation to curse God for what we expect and
assume He should provide us, including a sense of the meaning of our
professional lives that we have lost along the way. 3 There is the
temptation to bow down to the golden calf (not much analogical
imagination needed here!).5 4 There is even the temptation to reject the
reality of the barrenness in which we find ourselves sometimes, like the
children of Israel trying to find an alternative deity that will make them safe
in their hostile and dangerous land of exile.5
Law faculty members, even at religiously affiliated schools, may not
live out the dramatic existence of the Exodus, but in the comfort and
freedom of our lives, we are no less subject to these temptations. For a
mid-life law faculty member, it is easy to plod along from day to day,
rejecting the opportunity to search for meaning in our work or to ask
whether we are demanding that our students search for meaning in theirs.
It is easy to let the law become an arid mental exercise instead of a difficult
journey toward justice. While we may not have as many material "golden
calves" to tempt us as our colleagues in practice, law faculty members have
their own temptations for concrete personal security - the desire for status
in our profession, for the well-placed article, for the praise of a brilliant
panel presentation, for offers from prestigious schools or consulting
contracts.
The temptation to curse God or life in general or maybe even our own
central administration for not providing those creature comforts and status
that our law school classmates or colleagues have earned that we thought
would be ours by now is very real. And certainly, the temptation and
ability to put our faith in scholarship and teaching, and ignore the real
troubles of the world, even those pertinent to our own vocation - the
violations of human rights and civil rights law that go on even in our local
communities while we pontificate from the academy on old cases - is as
53. See Exodus 16:2-3 (RSV) (describing the murmurings of the Israelites after six
weeks of wandering in the wilderness).
54. See Exodus 32:1-7 (RSV) (Aaron fashions a golden calf for the Israelites to
worship to appease the Israelites when Moses has not returned from Mount Sinai).
55. See Howard J. Vogel, Dwelling in the Wilderness: Searching for Hope in Life and
Law, or an Exodus Within: The Spiritual Journey in Biblical Perspective (Dec. 16, 1995)
(unpublished paper) (on file with author).
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strong as the Israelites' willingness to deny the trouble in which they have
found themselves. Like them, we too want to go back to the safe but
imprisoning walls of our own past or our books instead of bravely
confronting the terror awaiting us in a flood of current injustices unraveling
work that many of us have done as lawyers or law professors. 56
The language of pilgrimage might teach us something here, though not
quite enough. First, it teaches by its pretense. Contemporary sociologists
tell us that underneath the surface of the pilgrimage myth, underneath its
egalitarian, self-abnegating, and transformative story, we will find that
pilgrimage is actually a contested activity, constructed and experienced
differently by different social classes of pilgrims." Whereas the myth of
pilgrimage proposes that all are equal and all are one in the pilgrimage, the
reality is that there are multiple experiences and ethics of pilgrimage, many
at odds with the very piety of the pilgrimage.58 For example, while what
Kaelber calls the medieval Christian "religious virtuoso" was renouncing
the world and transcending it through asceticism and good works, ordinary
people on pilgrimage lived out the "ethic of the average" by understanding
pilgrimage in a much more practical way - as a means of obtaining favors
from and expressing their devotion to the saints through pilgrimages in
their own regions.59 Similarly, the myth of penance and self-abnegation is
called into question by the actual accounts of pilgrimage sites, many of
them scenes of material indulgence and celebration rather than journeys of
self-abnegation and renunciation.60
Both medieval and recent accounts of pilgrimages have emphasized
the real goings-on beneath the surface that disrupt the myth of pilgrimage.
In opposition to the pilgrimage ideal of oneness and equality, pilgrimage
observers have emphasized race, class and nationality divisions that
separate and sometimes cause conflict among pilgrims in the experience. 6'
In opposition to the spirit of asceticism, often carnival-like distractions are
part of the pilgrimage scene - one account of the hajj, for example,
mentions not only the numerous bazaars and places of entertainment, but
the stands selling the forbidden that linger around the campgrounds in
Mecca.62 In opposition to the spirit of an inward renunciation and the
56. See, e.g., Exodus 15: 12 (NIV) (where the Israelites say to Moses, "Is not this what
we said to you in Egypt, 'Let us alone and let us serve the Egyptians' For it would have been
better for us to serve the Egyptians than to die in the wilderness.").
57. See Kaelber, supra note 42, at 52.
58. Id. at 54-57.
59. Id. at 55-57.
60. Id. at 59-60.
61. See, e.g., Andre Levy, To Morocco and Back: Tourism and Pilgrimage Among
Moroccan-Born Israelis, 35-36 (describing conflicts between Jewish pilgrims and their
Arab guides), at http://www.netlibrary.com/Reader/EbookPane.aspx (last visited Mar. 10,
2004).
62. See, e.g., Joel L. Kraemer, The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the
Holy Places, 40 HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 198 (2000) (book review), available at
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shedding of the old self, these accounts also suggest that modem
pilgrimages have become, rather than experiences to leave the self behind,
moments meant to enrich the sense of self and individuality, to identify
one's individual place in the world.63 As Blasi suggests, medieval penitents
needed to abandon the social situation in which a non-normative
identity had been established and return at a future date as a
changed person .... The penitential pilgrimage itself would be
an extended circumstance of liminality in which the individual
would undergo a transformation of self . . . . Contemporary
religious tourism presupposes a private religiosity. The feeling
for a greater cosmos leads the individual into a serial schedule of
experiences that individualize the person's place in the world.64
The image of pilgrimage easily lends itself to this sort of dual,
seemingly hypocritical journey of any faculty toward its institution's future.
The values of equality and oneness within our faculties are often belied by
the bitter divisions and pecking orders beneath the surface. Formal rank
and material rewards as well as informal recognitions for highly favored
activity such as scholarly productivity create a drama of hierarchy not
unlike early English kings, who traveled from pilgrims' shrines to other
events with itinerant courts evincing the trappings of power while wearing
the garb of peasants. 65 The appearance of self-abnegation indeed covers
over professional lives that are often self-focused and self-indulgent. It is
sometimes too much to consider changing how we teach or what we teach
or how much time we spend with students or what kind of scholarship or
service our community really needs from us, because we have found
comfortable niches of expertise in which we can profess to know most
everything and risk almost nothing. We are no longer challenged to cast
off the old self, but simply to multiply experiences (good texts, good
teaching moments, good conferences) that make our lives richer.
Moreover, the notion that we are on any inner journey of
sanctification with our students, or as between our selves, is belied by the
sense of meaninglessness we law academics sometimes feel about our own
professional lives. We want to forget how quotidian was the sacrifice that
the Holy Land pilgrim expected to transform his inner life, how
monotonous that five hundredth mile on the journey must have been, that
http://www.web6.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/957/701/45697836w6/purl=rc 1_EAI
M0 (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
63. See Anthony J. Blasi, Visitation to Disaster Sites, in FROM MEDIEVAL PILGRIMAGE
TO RELIGIOUS TOURISM, supra note 34, at 160.
64. Id.
65. See Nicholas Vincent, The Pilgrimages of the Angevin Kings of England 1154-
1272, in FROM MEDIEVAL PILGRIMAGE TO RELIGIOUS TOURISM, supra note 34, at 14-16.
Vincent notes that even the reception of these royal pilgrims was different, perhaps because
of their ability to bestow "rich offerings" of money and goods upon the monks and clergy
who attended the shrines.
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second month of hunger and exhaustion on the way. Rather than
considering our daily work as an exercise in putting off our old selves, and
pondering what sort of devotion we may be living out as we lecture in a
class or go to that everlasting committee meeting, we may fret about
whether we are providing enough separate religious experiences or rituals
to make our common lives spiritual and meaningful, whether the external
trappings of faith are sufficiently, or too much, represented in the academy.
These are, to my mind, the problematical absorptions of pilgrimage
reflection, despite its concededly salutary aspects. In focusing on self-
abnegation, we are still focusing upon the self. In striving for our own
sanctification, we are still striving for personal fulfillment.
The Exodus story, a story of leave-taking as much as it is going
toward a sacred place of pilgrimage, may present a more powerful image to
the faithful law faculty member or the faithful law student. In the story, the
main actor is not the self; the main problem is not how to sanctify oneself
through self-abnegation and penance, or how to achieve a liminal
experience. In Exodus, the main character is Yahweh; it is Yahweh who
does and says, and the people of Israel serve only as a witness to what God
speaks and does in the world. 66 The message of the Exodus narrative is
that God has "acted in decisive and transformative ways" in the world,67
and it is by God's action and not our own piety or penance that the world is
changed.
The Exodus story is the story of covenant, to be sure, but it is a
covenantal story in which God promises to us, in which God swears not
only to Abraham but also to the people wandering in the wilderness. God
speaks God's commitment to the people and obliges God's self to
faithfulness. Moreover, God blesses - God's words are a "bestowal of
life-force, related to generativity, birth, and reproduction, which the
powerful giver entrusts to the recipient."
68
Second, God does not only promise but God delivers, resolving to
"intervene decisively against every oppressive, alienating circumstance and
force that precludes a life of well-being." 69 The Exodus is the story of a
people being "'snatched' out of the danger of... slavery," of the defeat of
the forces of despair that want to deny Israel's well-being.70 It is the story
of people being bought by a great act of generosity. 71 That is, God does not
simply promise deliverance, but Yahweh enacts deliverance. Not only that,
66. WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT: TESTIMONY,
DIsPuTE, ADVOCACY 123 (1997).
67. Id. at 123.
68. Id. at 165.
69. Id. at 174.
70. Id. at 174-75, 179.
71. Id. at 175.
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but Yahweh enacts exoduses from oppression for everyone, not just an
exclusive people.72
Finally, God commands, as a "sovereign who has a legitimate right to
command, who expects rightly to be obeyed, and who has the power.., to
enforce the command," "[y]our life is under my sovereignty."73 It is a
command that demands that we live lives of Islam, of surrender to the one
God. The substance of this command is a transformative "social practice in
which the maintenance, dignity, security and well-being of every member
of the community are guarded in concrete ways, . . . [and] the community
has active responsibility for the well-being of each of its members."' 4
Brueggeman argues that the trajectory of this demand comes into tension
with another, that God demands that people live their lives "in an orderly
way," demands purity and "disciplines whereby the life-threatening
disorder may be overcome. "
75
This is the subversive message that overcomes the lawyer-pilgrim's
preoccupation with his own journey, with her own self-abnegation and
anxiety in the wilderness, whether it is the wilderness of the wider secular
profession that seeks to overwhelm or diminish her or the wilderness of the
daily routine that threatens to sap her life away.
IV. WHERE THE EXODUS LEADS
For Christian (and perhaps also predominantly Jewish and Muslim)
law schools, the tension between pilgrimage and Exodus creates a small but
critical epiphany: we have been asking the wrong question when we think
about how a religiously affiliated institution can integrate religious
minorities into its faculty. The question presumes that the institution, and
those who affiliate with its tradition, are the hosts, and religious minorities
are the guests.76 The Exodus story reminds us that we are all recipients of
the promise, we are all the ones redeemed out of oppression of the daily,
we are all the ones commanded to a life of transformative justice and holy
orderliness. To the extent that we feel stranded in the wilderness, our hope
is not in our own ability to change our circumstances, but our hope is in
Yahweh's ability to deliver, to keep His promises to us. The deepest
experience of the hajj is one of being a guest: as one pious Muslim
explained,
"When you come here" [to Mecca on hajj] .... "you are calling
on God, you are entering His House. The Talbiya is your
application for admittance to His House, a request for an
72. BRUEGGEMANN, supra note 66, at 178.
73. Id. at 182.
74. Id. at 189.
75. Id. at 190.
76. The core of these concluding insights I have learned from theologian Patrick
Keifert.
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appointment with Him. And that you were able to make the
Pilgrimage at all is a sign of God's willingness to accept you.
'"77
If we accept that the holiness of our institutions is not measured by
how many religious rituals or expressions we program into the curriculum
or the life of the law school, but how often we are open to hearing the
promise of God, whether from the mouths of students successfully making
a powerful argument or from the kindness of one faculty member toward
another, we are freed from preoccupation with the seemingly
overwhelming burdens of the self or the institution. For the freedom and
success of our institutions will not be dependent on how well we do in the
U.S. News or how many choices we make available to students and faculty,
but on how we acknowledge the gift of our being. In Christian terms, this
requires a double move: first, we must confess our own denial of God as an
agent breathing through our law schools; and second, we must
acknowledge that we are not our own saviors nor the saviors of our
institutions, but we are ourselves redeemed in every moment of our
sinfulness. The justice of our institutions is thus not dependent on how
successful we ourselves are in coming up with fair faculty policies or good
environments for our students. It rests on how willing we are to heed the
commands of God to do justice, seek mercy and walk humbly78 in the place
where we find ourselves to be.
77. Michael E. Jansen, An American Woman on Haj, in EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE
MUSLIM MIDDLE EAST 222, 229 (Donna Lee Bowen & Evelyn A. Early eds., 1993).
78. Micah 6:8 (RSV).
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